SSU Forum “The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State Under Xi Jinping”

In the intensifying competition between the United States and China for global supremacy, the ability to harness the complex interlinkages between economic development, national security, and technological innovation becomes all the more relevant. How is Xi Jinping turning China into a techno-security state that prioritizes building the country’s technological, security, and defense strengths to meet its expansive national security needs? Can China surpass the United States to become the preeminent global technological and security power, and how? These are some of the main questions answered by the new book by Professor Tai Ming Cheung of the University of California, San Diego, titled “Innovation to Dominate,” on the rise of the Chinese techno-security state.

On September 20, 2022, the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Future Initiatives, Security Studies Unit hosted Professor Tai Ming Cheung for a keynote address on his new book. Professor Jaehwan Lim from Aoyama Gakuin University joined Professor Cheung in conversation following the address before taking questions from the audience. The event was moderated by Ryo Sahashi, Associate Professor of International Relations from the University of Tokyo.

Keynote presentation

Professor Cheung began his remarks by sharing his observation that China, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, is a “security-maximizing state,” and it constructs its power and prestige on a sound economic and technological foundation. According to Cheung, Xi recognized that, for China to compete for global dominance in the twenty-first century, it was vital for the country to invest in its techno-security domain; the coordination of national security, innovation, and economic development play a key role in this. Cheung outlined the five national strategies and guidance issued by Xi to turn China into a techno-security state: the National Security Strategy, Innovation Driven Development Strategy, Military Strengthening in the New Era, Military Civil Fusion Development Strategy, and Economic Securitization Strategy.

In introducing Xi’s strategies for the Chinese techno-security state, Cheung conveyed Xi’s perception that the most dangerous threat to China is “internal, non-traditional, political, and emerging.” He argued that this understanding of national security laid the foundation for Xi’s “holistic national security concept” and provided the context for his policies emphasizing ideological purification and building a repressive security state. Having described Xi’s national security perspective, Cheung elaborated on other components of the Chinese techno-security state. These national strategies include Xi’s military direction to create a Chinese army not only large but “strong;” his design to achieve a seamlessly integrated military-civil innovation and industrial system to support the country’s quest for techno-security supremacy (albeit lacking bottom-up and market influences); and the plans to protect China’s macroeconomic foundation “through resilience, economic and technological self-reliance.”

By introducing the Selective Authoritarian Mobilization and Innovation (SAMI) model, Cheung shifted his focus to the country’s implementation of advancing strategic and defense innovation. This Chinese model illustrated the country’s advancement of critical strategic technology capabilities by leveraging the “core strengths of China’s political, economic, social, defense, and S&T systems.” In his explanation, Cheung pointed to two types of innovation featuring this top-down, selective development model: “re-innovation” (SAMI-A), a process of reproducing existing inventions by improving current knowledge and technology; and “discovery-driven” innovation (SAMI-B), focused on original innovation that leads to new products. According to Cheung, Xi has decided to transition from SAMI-A to SAMI-B to enable China to compete for technological and security supremacy. While the transition will face various challenges and resistance, Cheung anticipated that Xi would persist on this trajectory as China pursued global dominance.

Discussion and Q&A

Following Cheung’s remarks, Professor Lim joined the conversation. Lim praised Cheung’s work and the compelling argument in his book that Xi Jinping sought to pursue dominance in the global techno-security order by making a decisive shift in China’s national focus from development to security.

Lim posed questions regarding the opportunities and challenges Xi might face at home and abroad in his state-building efforts. He wondered how effective and sustainable the Chinese techno-security state could be domestically and to what extent the system’s effectiveness depended on Xi’s power and authority. In response, Cheung explained that China had a mixed record regarding formulating and implementing strategic defense innovations. Xi has faced both harsh strategic competition with the US and obstinate resistance from China’s bureaucracy when attempting to reallocate the resources necessary for building the techno-security state. Nevertheless, he has been able to press forward with the reform toward securitization faster than his predecessors.

Looking outside China, Lim asked whether China would require coalition-building to realize its goal of an effective techno-security state, particularly a counter-coalition in its strategic competition with the United States. Cheung answered by arguing that while China understood the difficulties in realizing its ambitions without the help of other countries – its reform required resources from overseas and export markets – it might have limited options when selecting allies. He argued that to prevent a US-led economic de-coupling from China, China was expected to intensify its efforts to entice other countries to ensure its global economic share.

Finally, the floor was opened to questions from the audience, many of which centered on China’s challenges in a highly uncertain international climate. When asked about the impact on China of Washington’s move to pressure US-investor divestment from Chinese companies linked to the Chinese military, Cheung stated that US sanctions might force China to double down on its efforts to achieve economic self-reliance. Cheung observed that de-escalating the tensions between the United States and China required political leaders and policymakers on both sides to understand what was genuinely critical for each’s national security rather than painting everything in zero-sum terms. There were also questions regarding the military lessons China might learn from the recent war in Ukraine. Cheung responded that while it remains too early to discuss lessons from an ongoing battle, the war in Ukraine should allow the Chinese government to realize that war was not simply about technological determination and military power; it’s also about the morale of the military.

=SSU Forum= Part1

=SSU Forum= Part2