The 8th Japan-Korea Dialogue

On November 16, 2019, this year’s “Japan Korea Dialogue” was held at the SMBC Academia Hall of the Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo. The topic was “U.S.-China Competition: Securitization of Technology and Its Implications for the International Relations in Northeast Asia.” The first session, “The U.S.-China conflict and Technologies – The Trade War and Huawei,” moderated by Ryo Sahashi, The University of Tokyo, began at around 10am with a presentation by Professor Dukgeun AHN from Seoul National University. To prevent China from dominating the realm of 5G technology, U.S. has singled out Huawei as the main target in the technology warfare, excluding its 5G products from federal infrastructures. Pressured to follow this decision, other countries unwilling to give up cheaper Chinese products are caught in a dilemma. But this is perhaps just another way for U.S. to pressurize China. During China’s WTO accession negotiation, U.S. mandated regulatory changes. In 2007, it tried to influence exchange rate policies by modifying IMF rules. FTAs have been used to introduce new elements of trade rules. And now, U.S. plans to modify the WTO system to alter future trade frameworks. Whether the trade war will develop into a multilateral conflict remains to be seen.

Professor Satoru MORI from Hosei University followed by analyzing how the U.S. government is not always united concerning technology warfare issues. New technologies are key to maintaining dominance in various fields. While “Washington,” or bureaucracy and congress, has defined the competition from a broad, strategic perspective, for President Trump and his administration, it has mainly been a pretext to apply pressure on China so as to eliminate trade deficit or protect U.S. industry. For example, tariffs and restrictions on Huawei are a national security necessity for Washington, aiming to boost technological innovation and realize “decoupling” to prevent technology transfers to China. On the other hand, the Trump administration uses it to extract concessions from China to recalibrate U.S.-China economic relations. But Professor MORI pointed out that many experts consider “decoupling” as an unrealistic goal when countries are interdependent in various fields.
After the two presentations, participants discussed how the conflict will affect Japan and Korea. Whereas U.S. government’s goal used to be liberalizing the Chinese market, now it has changed to technological “decoupling,” a rather novel situation. Yet, countries including Korea have depended on the Chinese economy, and restricting the use of relatively cheap Chinese products would mean increases in costs for building infrastructures. Also, as U.S. and China rely on each other economically, for them to become technologically self-sufficient soon is quite unlikely, again emphasizing the difficulty of “decoupling.” Many Chinese are already members of the U.S. society, and although there is fear of technology transfers, Chinese talents within the country need to be utilized to boost U.S. innovation. Therefore, pursuing technological “decoupling” may result in debasing the foundation of innovation itself. In the end, it was suggested that perhaps Japan and Korea can only passively observe, anticipating that the tension between the two countries will loosen after China partially accepts U.S. demands or changes in policies due to change of government occurs.

In the second session, two speakers gave a presentation under the title “The U.S.-China Conflict and Issues at Hand — The East/South China Seas and the Indo-Pacific Vision/Strategy,” moderated by Jae Ho CHUNG, Seoul National University. First, Masafumi IIDA, Senior Research Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies, focused on the situation in the East/South China Seas, and pointed out four main objectives for China’s recent aggressive invasion into the region: first, to resolve territorial issues advantageously concerning Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, or the Spratly Islands by actually being present in the terrain, second, to expand the country’s maritime rights and interests to become more self-sufficient of energy or natural resources required for economic growth, third, to stabilize the security surrounding maritime transportation which is indispensable for trade including energy import, and fourth, to pursue military superiority in preparation for possible future conflicts with U.S. In recent years, the numbers of Chinese official ships, warships, and military aircraft in the East China Sea have increased. China’s military buildup on its artificial islands near Hainan Island in the South China Sea continues, and interference with U.S. warships has also increased. Alarmed, U.S. has taken countermeasures. Backed by differences in political values, the conflict may spread to fields other than military, and could become the factor that determines the structure of the Indo-Pacific security.

Next, Professor Hyun Wook KIM of Korea National Diplomatic Academy commented on three issues: the current situation of U.S.-China competition, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and reactions of other countries including Korea. Several definitions of the competition exist, but China’s GDP is still around 70% of that of the U.S., and considering the official descriptions of the situation, it may be too soon to define it as “hegemonic conflict.” “Systemic competition” and “in-system competition” are also not appropriate, since the two countries are both within the same international order and global economy, unlike the rivalry during the Cold War era. Reflecting on how the Trump administration is aiming to maintain U.S. dominance through cooperation with allies and bureaucratic reorganization, it was argued that the current situation should be defined as “strategic competition.” As for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, which is supposedly a whole-of-government pressure on China, in actuality, the budget for supporting infrastructure building in developing countries does not quite compare with that of China’s, and several European countries such as Italy or Turkey aspire stronger ties with China. The international society should be aware of the “Kindleberger trap” instead of the “Thucydides trap.” And as for the U.S.-Korea relations, with the transfer of wartime control over the combined forces to the Korean military planned, how U.S. will maintain its military dominance in the region should be observed carefully.
Following the two presentations, China’s objectives were discussed. Instead of global dominance, the country may be seeking regional dominance, but because projects for Central and South America, Africa, and Europe are included in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), others argued otherwise. Comments on the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy were also made, mainly questioning its contribution to maintaining the country’s global hegemony since the current framework forces its allies to endure economic costs.

The last session was titled “The U.S.-China Conflict and Bilateral Relations: Japan-China Relations and Korea-China Relations,” moderated by Akio Takahara, The University of Tokyo. Professor Hankwon KIM of Korea National Diplomatic Academy first led the discussion. Previously, the hegemon controlled international norms and order, therefore maintaining its dominance both economically and militarily. But today, China is benefiting the most from the international order U.S. established, and the alarmed U.S. is proposing new norms and order in its favor. China has partially accepted U.S. demands and made concession, but if the U.S. approach issues related to China’s “core interests” in a similar manner, the conflict may intensify and evolve into a hegemonic competition. The Trump administration has already shown support for Taiwan, a major issue related to China’s “core interests,” and the protests in Hong Kong has given U.S. impetus to focus on humanitarian issues altogether, including Uyghur district and Tibet. Human rights have fundamental values in the international society. The U.S. may seize this opportunity to add pressure on China. Between the two super powers, Korea is forced into a difficult situation, especially since the current administration, inaugurated after the Candle Revolution, has valued human rights.
The final speaker was Professor Tomoki KAMO from Keio University, and reviewed Japan-China relations from four perspectives. The recent improvements seen in the relationship between the two governments were traced back to 2014 when China announced its BRI. Then, China began to consider the Japanese Prime Minister Abe as a legitimate negotiating partner, first, because the Prime Minister showed support for the BRI, and second, because the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party extended the term of office of its party president, opening up the possibility of a long-term administration under Prime Minister Abe. There are also economical improvements, such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the China Development Bank (CDB) agreeing in 2017 to cooperate on projects in third country markets. Yet, security issues are unresolved, with the number of Chinese ships sailing near the Senkaku Islands increasing since 2008. As for the public sentiment in the two countries, both tend to consider the other country as a threat, leading to hesitation in economic cooperation.
After the two presentations, it was pointed out that changes in China’s attitude has provoked the U.S., such as the expansion of its “core interests” to include maritime rights and interests or noticeable efforts paid to alter international norms. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was acknowledged as an issue subsumed under the U.S.-China competition. Many attendees agreed “time is on China’s side,” which urges China to prepare for a long-term negotiation, while the U.S. will demand quicker outcomes, and the next few years may be crucial for the competition. On the other hand, with the pace of economic growth declining and the budget deficit expanding, China may have already passed its peak, but perhaps China’s psychological warfare was too effective in discouraging the U.S. The discussion ended with participants agreeing that Japan and Korea need to collaborate, closely following the U.S.-China competition.

*This workshop was organized by subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.