The 9th Japan-Korea Dialogue

This year’s Japan-Korea Dialogue was held in the afternoon of November 7, 2020. Security researchers from Japan and Korea gathered to exchange views on U.S.-China relations after the 2020 U.S. presidential election and associated policy issues facing Japan and Korea. The ninth dialogue was held in the form of an online meeting with two sessions titled “The Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations” and “Japan’s and Korea’s Responses to Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Trade/Technological Competition, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), and Hong Kong/Xinjiang” respectively. Each session started with two keynote presentations, one each from both Japan and Korea, then moved on to a general discussion. Continuing from the previous time, the 9th Japan-Korea Dialogue was supported by subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Session 1 “The Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations”

Session 1 “The Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations,” moderated by Professor Jae Ho CHUNG, Seoul National University, began at 2:00 pm with keynote presentations by Professor Woos eon CHOI from Korea National Diplomatic Academy and Professor Toshihiro NAKAYAMA from Keio University.

Professor Wooseon CHOI started by analyzing the present status of U.S.-China relations. Although the current U.S.-China relations may not be in a state of cold war at the moment, confrontation between the two countries is reaching an irreversible stage, even as the two countries have increasingly become economically interdependent on each other since 2009 and their power balance has changed due to the rapid rise of China’s power. In sum, the two major powers are about to enter an era of intensive competition that is expected to continue for the medium to long term. Professor Wooseon CHOI also noted that, with the increasing probability of a Biden win, the next U.S. administration will likely mean a return to international cooperation, and in terms of its policy toward China, it will likely try to strike a balance between engagement and hedging, unlike that of the current Trump administration.

Professor Toshihiro NAKAYAMA pointed out that while the final results of the U.S. elections have yet to be determined, in light of the fact that President Trump has won over 70 million votes and the results of the U.S. Congress’ elections, we cannot posit that the U.S. citizens have necessarily rejected President Trump. Professor NAKAYAMA further explained, from Japan’s point of view, how China policy of the U.S. transitioned from the Obama presidency to the present Trump presidency and based on understanding of such transition, outlined the policy issues that the next U.S. administration will face.

According to Professor NAKAYAMA, Japan would welcome a U.S. China policy that is slightly harder-line than Japan’s, but the Obama administration, although it later shifted to the policy of “strategic rebalancing,” initially pursued cooperation with China with an eye to addressing global issues such as climate change. The lack of a clear priority order between policies for climate change and China within the Obama administration led to some confusion on the Japanese side. When Trump took over the office, it adopted a confrontational attitude against China, but initially viewed China as an economic threat rather than a strategic one. However, the Trump administration is recently taking an even harder line against China than Japan is, as demonstrated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s statement urging China’s citizens to “change the behavior” of their government. The provocative attitude of the U.S. is becoming another concern for Japan.

Professor Nakayama went on to point out that even if Trump were to win his second term as president, given that the main goal of his first administration was to be re-elected, at this point he doesn’t have any concrete policies for his second term, and that while the confrontation between the U.S. and China is projected to extend over the long term, the U.S. government tends to view the issues that lie between the two major powers in a simplified way. On the other hand, if Biden came to power, we could expect a return to “normal” policies, because although he may not make an easy compromise with China, he wouldn’t go so far as to urge the Chinese to change their regime. Attention is required, however, as a systematic conflict between the two “Cs” – the Climate warriors and China hawks – may arise within the Biden administration. Whichever the case, there is little chance that the next U.S. administration will return completely to international cooperation or make a complete turnaround from the present China policies, which enjoy popular support.

Based on the above keynote presentations by Professors CHOI and NAKAYAMA, the general discussion addressed the following issues: indicators for recognizing whether the U.S. and China are in a state of cold war; the potential continuity and difference in policies between the Trump and Biden administrations, specifically to what extent will the Biden administration follow Trump’s policies in terms of FOIP, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and U.S.-Taiwan relations; and whether the policy conflict within the new administration is a systematic conflict or stems from structural factors of the international system.
With regard to TPP, it was pointed out that although the partnership was driven by former Democratic President Obama, even if Biden takes the office, it may be difficult for the U.S. to return to TPP in consideration of the situation within the Democratic Party. As for FOIP, given the fact that the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been established as an official name of the U.S. armed forces responsible for the region, the current policy will likely be basically inherited by the new administration. It was also noted that the China policies of the new U.S. administration will be determined taking into consideration third country factors such as the situation of Japan and Korea.

Session 2 “Japan’s and Korea’s Responses to Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Trade/Technological Competition, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), and Hong Kong/Xinjiang”

Session 2 “Japan’s and Korea’s Responses to Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Trade/Technological Competition, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), and Hong Kong/Xinjiang,” moderated by Professor Akio TAKAHARA, The University of Tokyo Faculty of Law, began at 3:45 pm with keynote presentations by Associate Professor Ryo SAHASHI, T
The University of Tokyo Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia and Professor Jae Ho CHUNG, Seoul National University.

Associate Professor Ryo SAHASHI cited the current U.S. moves, represented by Trump’s economic security measures to set hard-line policies in a unilateral manner without discussing with its allies, as one of the major concerns about the Trump administration’s China policies, stating that such policies are not only unsound but may not function without the cooperation of U.S. allies. If Biden was to take the office, U.S. China policies will turn away from unilateralism back to emphasizing cooperation with its allies.

Associate Professor SAHASHI noted Suga administration’s utilitarian responses as a characteristic of the new administration’s foreign policies, taking as an example, its positive messages to strengthen relations with Korea and with China as well. On the other hand, the structural conflict between the U.S. and China will become a constraining factor on the foreign policies of the Suga administration.

With regard to FOIP, Japan will probably continue to uphold FOIP as the basic guidelines for Japan’s foreign and security policies, despite some confusion observed within the Japanese government. As for the cooperation framework between the U.S., Japan, Australia and India known as the QUAD, Associate Professor SAHASHI pointed out that although the U.S. and India emphasize this framework as the axis of security cooperation in the region, it will only serve as part of the regional security architecture since the framework does not include the ASEAN nations. As for TPP, he doubted the possibility of the U.S. returning to TPP even under a Biden administration.

Concerning economic security issues, an economic division was formed under the National Security Secretariat of the National Security Council of Japan in April. Preparation to legislate this issue is taking place within the Japanese government, but Associate Professor SAHASHI thinks that it will take some time before the government and the ruling party can reach a consensus, because there are rather radical discussions going on in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party about stepping up Japan’s responses to U.S.-China conflict and the rapid expansion of Chinese power.

With regard to concerns over human rights, while the Japanese government may express its concern about Xinjiang and other human rights issues in China through statements in line with the U.S. and EU, it is unlikely to launch policy actions including economic sanctions against China.

In relation to missile defense, the Japanese government recently abandoned its plan to deploy the Aegis Ashore system partly due to objections from municipalities where the system was supposed to be deployed. Although an alternative plan has been proposed to replace the abandoned plan, questions have been raised about the cost and effectiveness of this new plan, suggesting that careful consideration will be required before making any further decisions.

Professor Jae Ho CHUNG notes that, as the U.S.-China conflict intensifies, either the U.S. or China will more often try to compel other related countries to do something in their favor, and the same thing will likely happen even if Biden came to office. We also need to take into consideration that Korea is far more economically dependent on China than Japan, which is a fact affecting the China policies of the Moon administration.

As for FOIP, Korea attempted to seek certain affinity with both FOIP advocated by the U.S. and China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, based on the “New Southern Policy” announced by the Moon administration in 2017 soon after he came to office. As this shows, Professor Jae Ho CHUNG pointed out that, while interest in FOIP itself was rather low in Korea, its initial attitude towards FOIP has changed, faced by U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea and organization of the QUAD.

As for economic security issues, particularly those related to Huawei, Professor Jae Ho CHUNG explained that like Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries, Korea initially adopted the UK’s policy model of allowing limited introduction of Huawei’s products. However, when UK reversed its policy in response to requests from the U.S. and banned all Huawei products, a dilemma arose in Korea as to whether the government or the companies should take on the responsibilities to respond to this situation.

With regard to the development of post-INF missiles, Professor Jae Ho CHUNG pointed out that Korea is required to maintain a subtle balance between the U.S. and China, especially due to trauma from the THAAD incident.

As for human rights concerns, Professor Jae Ho CHUNG noted that in Korea, the situation of Xinjiang is rarely taken up as a single issue, but a series of issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang are often bundled together. Regarding Hong Kong in particular, given that Hong Kong is the fourth largest trading partner for Korea, it may be difficult for Korea to take a position consistent with that of the U.S. and EU countries.

Finally, in light of the current situation surrounding Korea, Professor Jae Ho CHUNG posed a question: if Korea was faced with military threat, U.S. would probably assist Korea as an ally, but if economic sanctions are imposed on Korea as a retaliatory measure, would the U.S. support Korea? Moreover, we tend to use the word “friends” and “fellow countries” without precisely defining its meaning, but does it mean all countries with a democratic regime or those that share a military alliance? Does support by fellow countries include “collective action” beyond national systems and particular alliances? He raised these questions as aspects that need to be taken into consideration.

Following the above keynote presentations by Assistant Professor SAHASHI and Professor Jae Ho CHUNG, the ninth Japan-Korea Dialogue closed with an active and straightforward discussion centered on how Japan and Korea should act amidst the conflict between the U.S. and China.

※This conference was organized by subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.