12th Five Universities Conference on “East Asia Conflict and Cooperation”

The 12th Five University Conference took place on the mornings of December 11 and 12, 2020. An annual event involving five academic institutions (The University of Tokyo (UTokyo), Princeton University, Peking University, Korea University, and the National University of Singapore), the Five University Conference provides an opportunity for researchers primarily specializing in foreign policy and security to join in a multifaceted analysis of the East Asian security environment and discuss how to maintain regional safety and prosperity.

The 2020 event, which addressed the theme of conflict and cooperation in East Asia, was hosted by Princeton University, with discussion taking place across four panels in an online format. The six UTokyo participants were Institute for Future Initiatives Director Kiichi Fujiwara, who led the conference, along with Professors Masahiro Kohara, Keisuke Iida, Hideaki Shiroyama, and Akio Takahara, and Associate Professor Ryo Sahashi. (A full list of participants can be found at the bottom of this article.) The main points from each panel discussion are noted below. Because this year’s conference took place under the Chatham House Rule, speaker identity and affiliation have not been specified.

Panel One: The State of the World

The first panel sought to pinpoint the most important developments over the last year, the implications of these for East Asia, the factors behind them, and the opportunities for multilateral cooperation in dealing with them.

The three main developments identified were COVID-19, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, and the intensification of U.S.-China trade friction. The absence of U.S. leadership was posited as one factor behind these. In relation to COVID-19, panelists agreed that governments in East Asia had responded relatively effectively compared to other regions. At the same time, they observed that whereas natural disasters, currency crises, and other issues impacting widely on the East Asian region have in the past been addressed through multilateral cooperation spearheaded by the United States, there had been no such attempt under the Trump administration. This was possibly also related to the failure of the U.S. to work with its allies to respond effectively to the recent North Korean nuclear and missile development and Chinese military expansion. On the other hand, China has become a supplier of international public goods, providing various countries with goods and materials to combat COVID-19.

Despite this, recent public opinion polls in Southeast Asia, suggest that people there have less confidence in China now than last year. This is possibly less due to opposition to China’s ideology and system of governance than to wariness arising from COVID-19 and unease over China’s recent behavior, which has become increasingly focused on the national interest with little regard for other nations. As a result, rather than choosing between the U.S. and Chinese superpowers, the East Asian nations might instead use ASEAN to strengthen Southeast Asian partnership, opting for the ‘third way’ of multilateral cooperation.

Panel Two: November 3, 2020–Now What?

Panel Two discussed the results of the U.S. presidential election and the implications of the emergence of a new administration for East Asia. Panelists agreed that despite Trump’s ongoing refusal to concede defeat, the transition to Biden administration is inevitable and that the incoming Biden administration is highly likely to revert to the pre-Trump trajectory of prioritizing multilateral cooperation and partnership with allies.

At the same time, the sheer number of Trump votes in the 2020 election suggests that the Biden administration will be hamstrung at least to some extent by the policies of the outgoing administration. The domestic political situation will stand in the way of Biden pursuing his espoused policy trajectory of multilateral cooperation and economic liberalism, with the demands of domestic politics likely to push foreign policy from top place on the Biden agenda for the near future.

On the foreign policy front, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept rolled out by the Trump administration is expected to live on under Biden, despite a certain level of discomfort with the FOIP designation. A U.S. return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership arrangement pursued by Obama is, however, unlikely given the current domestic climate. When it comes to China, Biden will probably abandon his predecessor’s aggressive push for regime change and seek instead to rebuild the bilateral relationship within certain parameters.

In terms of the response to the U.S. election results, it was observed that some Japanese had supported Trump’s re-election because they distrusted Obama’s China policy and were worried that Biden might also take a soft line on China. This was, however, by no means a representative or majority view, and note also needed to be taken that the Trump administration’s hard-line diplomacy had failed to change China’s policies or actions.

Panel Three: The Geopolitical Moment and the State of the Global Economy

This panel examined the direction of the world economy, how U.S.-China competition and conflict over international economic rules and institutions might impact East Asia, who should provide global economic leadership going ahead, and how they should do so.

Panelists noted that China was in the process of replacing the United States as the heart of the world economy, with the transfer of power taking place in East Asia at this moment. Would the United States be able to sustain its role as the champion of free and open market economy, while also bearing the cost of doing so? Would it be able to simultaneously maintain its status as the provider of security? Or might China take over these roles in the future? While Biden would probably prefer a conventional economic liberal trajectory, the weakening of U.S. economic muscle due to globalization is unlikely to produce much domestic support for the further pursuit of free economy. The likely first step for the new administration will be to seek to restore U.S. leadership in international economic rulemaking.

Another issue raised in the panel discussion was policy autonomy in East Asia. As was strikingly apparent in responses to COVID-19, East Asian countries evince a greater degree of policy autonomy than other regions. When examining future world economic trends, rather than focusing on developments in the U.S. and Chinese superpowers, it might actually be more valuable to examine the effectiveness of the policies adopted by the governments of these smaller East Asian countries.

Panel Four: Visions of the Next World Order

Seventy-five years after the end of World War II, the U.S.-China relationship is becoming increasingly complex, with the conflict between the two countries at odds with their growing economic interdependence. Meanwhile, the power of Western democracies is fading even as Chinese power grows. How might we rethink and reimagine the world order? Two sharply contrasting views emerged from the panel. One was that the current world order is history’s best and should be sustained. The other conversely focused on the danger of the current world order continuing.

Proponents of the first view argued that the world is in the best state in human history, with maintenance of the global-scale free and open trade system under the current world order expanding the ranks of the middle class around the world and greatly reducing poverty. Discussion should focus not on building a new world order, but rather on how to maintain the current order. The values shaping the current order are supported because they have helped to raise living standards on a global scale, not because of the leadership of certain countries. In that sense, it is not particularly important what country heads existing international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Following that logic, maintaining the current world order will depend not so much on a specific country taking the lead as on protection of the underlying values and rules. Another point raised was that the values shaping the current world order are not limited to free trade and democracy but include all the values identified in the United Nations Charter, namely non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, preservation of territorial integrity, and respect for sovereignty. It was detrimental to emphasize only certain of these values.

Those arguing that the current world order is on the verge of crisis argued that maintaining a value-based order requires one or more powers to protect it. The current world order based on freedom and democracy was established in the era of Pax Americana when U.S. leadership was at its peak. The rapid expansion of Chinese power is challenging that world order, and maintaining and enhancing it will be difficult if the free democracies do not work together, spearheaded by the U.S. as the source of 70 percent of world GDP. From that perspective too, it was felt that the Biden administration will place greater emphasis on partnership and cooperation with other free democracies and adopt policies promoting the reform of existing international institutions.

Between these two opposed views lay a more neutral perspective, namely that China is not challenging the current world order but rather the structure of the international system. Accordingly, it will not necessarily be particularly effective for Western nations to adopt hard-line diplomacy in relation to China. Diplomacy designed to change Chinese policies and actions is more important. Moreover, looking ahead, the new threat of climate change could well represent the more serious problem, which, even as the Trump administration has looked the other way, has only continued to grow. We need to move swiftly to rebuild frameworks for the provision of technical assistance to the developing world from the developed world and to establish a multi-layered multilateral cooperation framework that will address this unprecedented peril in a form inclusive of the private sector, such as corporate initiatives to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

※This conference was organized by subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.