SDGs Symposium: The Nexus of International Politics in Climate Change and Water Resource

OPENING REMARKS: Kiichi Fujiwara, Director, Institute for Future Initiatives, UTokyo

The forum opened with remarks from Director Fujiwara, explaining the purpose of the event.

The general objective of the overall research program is to understand the issue of climate change, which poses a major challenge to the global political order and can have severe consequences. Climate change is an issue that concerns both natural sciences (the rise of global temperature) and social sciences (global conflicts). Water is a critical resource that needs to be researched macroscopically with the active participation of relevant scholars in international relations and international governance.

The research also focused on area studies, looking at individual regions in terms of the nexus between climate change and conflicts. In the recent past, the issue of climate change has gained greater public attention, and carbon neutrality has become a shared issue among major powers. The question that needs to be answered specifically is whether we have appropriate coping strategies to address the challenges of global warming due to rapid climate change.

PANEL 1: RISK ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND COUNTERACTION

“Governance of Interconnected Risks – The Case of Climate Change from Transition Perspective”
Hideaki Shiroyama, Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, UTokyo

Professor Shiroyama highlighted the challenges faced by various stakeholders vis-à-vis the interconnected risks and the strength of governance and institutions. He outlined the risk assessment and countermeasure paths.

Rapid risks occur suddenly, and the severity is highest in the initial phase. Comparatively, climate change is slow, but its impact is severe. Fragmented framing is one way to deal with climate-related risks. However, the consequences and possible political processes following framing can be different.

In terms of increased scope of impact, a clear impact elicits a quick political response. Conversely, enlarging impacts have a shared outcome and are not just due to climate change. For a specific impact, climate change can have some role, but the context matters for the most part. Increased framing has both positive and negative aspects. Although disaster reduction and adaptation deal with similar and overlapping phenomena, having a broader impact in an integrated manner may sometimes be difficult.

With respect to the major actors for the countermeasures of climate change politics, there is a multi-layered, polycentric approach. Sometimes, government-level decisions are very volatile, but the public-private sector; local level, enterprise and finance network played an important role in displaying resilience towards the action of climate change.

With reference to the potential strategy for responding to climate change issues, climate risk is connected to different risks, and its response can be interconnected. One potential countermeasure to climate change is interconnected transition; hence, the concept of co-evolution is used in the transition studies.

Regarding the governance aspect, there are several similarities and differences. The components of the transition strategy have potential linkages. Positive and negative aspects exist, but complementarity can exist between the two transitions.

An important part of the response strategy is to consider the potential of these synchronizations or co-evolutions of complementarity.

“Climate Change-Conflict Nexus and National risk assessment Exercises: The UK and Singapore”
Yee Kuang Heng, Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, UTokyo

Professor Heng looked at how countries such as the UK and Singapore have been developing institutional and policy structures to assess the potential nexus between climate change and conflict risks.

Although global risks are interconnected, it is difficult to study them in isolation. The outbreak of COVID-19 reminds us that our world is in an age of global risks that are shaping the world and of the ways in which risks can be better managed. Varying global risk reports describe climate change as an existential threat that is the top priority for global policy agenda. In terms of climate change and conflicts, the project maps out how governments can work to anticipate risks and unwanted outcomes, albeit with a fair amount of uncertainty.

As national risk assessment exercises have several documented flaws and weaknesses in existing literature, the project contributes to such debates through comparative case studies of the UK and Singapore, as both countries have long institutional experience in foresight and invested resources to anticipate strategic surprises. Preliminary findings suggest that time horizons and legislative mandates appear to matter and shape the way in which risk assessments are conducted.

Small futures groups are now embedded across UK and Singapore government agencies. The UK’s Government Office of Science has a futures team that supports embedding of futures tools across the whole civil service. Singapore’s Center for Strategic Futures runs FutureCraft workshops and has developed the Scenario Planning Plus Toolkit for civil servants.

In conclusion, Professor Heng wondered if there is room for input and security clearances for outside experts and how engagements with local communities and first responders can be improved in assessing potential climate impact and implications for conflicts.

“Would Solar Geoengineering Exacerbate Conflicts?”
Masahiro Sugiyama, Associate Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, UTokyo

Professor Sugiyama focused on risk or potential risk reduction from solar geoengineering.

Although worldwide efforts are being made towards achieving net zero by the year 2050, one measure that can deal with the uncertainty of climate science is geoengineering, also known as climate engineering. This refers to the large-scale intervention in Earth’s climate system. There are two main methods of climate engineering: solar geoengineering and carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

CDR, also known as negative emissions technology, reduces the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. Ocean iron fertilization is one kind of CDR and refers to spraying iron into the ocean to enhance photosynthesis.

A prominent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that if the world tries to limit the temperature increase to well below 2 degrees or to achieve the net zero target or carbon neutrality, it would require far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society. There is thus a possibility of rapid, deep decarbonization even with CDR. If these efforts fail, the world needs a Plan B as climate change will not wait. This is why solar geoengineering is getting traction. The most discussed strategy is global cooling by spraying reflective particles into the stratosphere.

Emergent technologies such as solar geoengineering have potential risks. However, if the use of solar geoengineering is prohibited, the failure to reduce emissions will lead to climate change.

Climate change is known to exacerbate conflicts, though more research needs to be conducted. In this literature, conflict is framed as a function of deviations of temperature and precipitation. Therefore, solar geoengineering could reduce conflicts by reducing climate change, especially if deployed at a moderate scale.

In conclusion, solar geoengineering presents a new risk-risk tradeoff and may reduce armed conflicts, although it comes with a lot of caveats. Lastly, climate is not a singular risk but is an interconnectedness of risks that need to be worked on.

PANEL 1: Q&A

After the three presentations, the panelists took questions from the audience.

On the question of having a population control policy to reduce climate change, Professor Heng reminded of the Limits to Growth argument that discussed of maintaining a balance between access to resources and a growing population. Industrial-scale development also plays a major role in contributing to climate change, which is much more significant than the contribution of population growth. Hence, there is no one-size-fits-all approach.

In response to a question about developing an integrated approach, linked with the SDGs approach and cooperative regime, Professor Shiroyama stated that interconnected risk relating to interconnected benefit is a win-win situation for different policy purposes and an important part of the response to climate change. On the question of whether the One Health Initiative is relevant to climate change and response to COVID, Professor Shiroyama informed that this approach is potentially interesting and complements human and natural health.

Regarding the macroeconomic model for cost risk evaluation, Professor Shiroyama stated that some quantification is necessary for discussing cost allocation. The basic way of setting cost allocation is through attribution of responsibility.

Another method is based on the capability. There exists an argument between the developing and the developed countries about the role played in responding to the cost of the countermeasures.

Professor Sugiyama added that scientists are trying to characterize uncertainty through different models. Uncertainty does not imply that climate change does not occur. It is a range of impacts when it comes to water resources and hydrology.

On the question about the link between welfare and canceling global warming, Professor Sugiyama cited William Nordhaus’ damage function. The damage functions are typically a function of the temperature increase. Canceling global warming by spraying sulfuric acid into the stratosphere could reduce climate damage, which could, in turn, increase human welfare.

PANEL 2: CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICTS

“‘Scarcity’ in Times of Plenty: Water, Governance and Everyday Politics in Metro Manila”
Nazia Hussain, Project Assistant Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, UTokyo

Professor Hussain’s talk focused on whether water crises may contribute to social and political unrest in cities. Especially in the Global South, where complicated ground realities do not conform to traditional notions of state/society boundaries and formal governments may be one among multiple players engaged in service provision. Although water crises resulting from climate-related risks as well as demographic changes present a serious concern, access to water is scarce even during “normal” times in many cities. In fact, not having access may be a default scenario for marginalized populations.

While seemingly straightforward, the question cuts across thematic boundaries. Literature on political ecology questions the notion of “natural” scarcity—instead pointing out that scarcity is produced through political and economic decisions. Similarly, the causality between scarcity of resources leading to conflict is challenged by discussions that highlight the micro dynamics of conflict. Patterns of governance in many cities illustrate that scarcity cannot be understood purely in terms of (mis)management of resources. Multiple players involved in the provision of services including water are part of the social, economic, and political landscapes. In sum, political unrest does not result in direct response to stressors. Stressors, including depleting resources, interact with dynamic ground realities in urban spaces.

Based on interviews, focus group discussions and a survey of 800 urban poor households, Dr. Hussain presented her analysis of the case study of Metro Manila. Findings suggest that despite privatization of water, access for urban poor households is rife with uncertainty and vulnerability. Multiple players, including syndicates and water cooperatives are involved in water provision. Politicians, government officials at varying levels, and NGOs are part of this landscape. Water for the urban poor is a precious commodity—they pay more even if the quality of water is poor, and its supply is not reliable.

During the water crisis of 2019, the urban poor suffered more in terms of paying more while not getting access to water on a regular basis. Individual coping responses included rationing usage of water. However, discontent was palpable among communities, highlighting that individual grievances were at the cusp of entering the social realm.

These sensitive perturbations may be lost through macro accounts locating causal relationships between scarcity and political unrest. The answer lies in employing the lens of local details to map potential pathways of social and political unrest as cities experience water crises all over the world.

“Water Conflicts from a Panoramic Perspective and under a Magnifying Glass”
Takeshi Wada, Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, UTokyo

Professor Wada gave a panoramic overview of water conflicts worldwide, with the aim of finding empirical data about hotspots of water conflicts around the world.

In this regard, there are four interesting and useful databases. First, the International Water Event Database records conflicts not only by country but also by transboundary river basins. It also records episodes of cooperation and grades the intensity of the interactions. The locations of frequent cooperative events coincide with the hotspots of conflict. This implies that the countries are not just fighting but also working to solve the problems at the same time. Most water conflicts occur not at the international borders between countries but inside the borders. The second database, the WARICC, provides information about these domestic water conflicts. Both databases collected data more than 10 years ago. The process of creating and updating event databases is quite expensive.

The next two databases overcome these obstacles and inform about the most recent water conflicts. The Pacific Institute uses publicly available conflict databases to gather information on violent conflicts associated with water resources. This data classifies water conflict into three types; casualty, wherein water resources or water systems become intentional or incidental casualties or targets of violence; weapon, wherein water resources or water systems are used as a tool or a weapon in a violent conflict; and trigger, wherein water is the root cause of conflict. The data shows that the Sahel region and South Asia are the major areas of conflict triggered by water issues.

The final database is GDELT. It uses natural language processing and big data approaches to monitor news sources from around the world to detect events of conflict and cooperation in real time. Water-related conflicts are extracted from GDELT using Google BigQuery and plotted on the world map. Although it is difficult to interpret whether GDELT takes into account political events or only news articles and how accurate the codings are, it is reassuring that the members of the KAKENHI project are conducting case studies on water conflicts from the major hotspots detected by GDELT.

“The Path from Climate Change to Conflicts: in Africa’s Sahel Region”
Kazuyo Hanai, Assistant Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, UTokyo

Professor Hanai reflected on the issue of climate change that has impacted the livelihood of vulnerable people, particularly in the Sahel region. Climate change in this region involves increasing temperature, unstable rainfall, and extreme weather including floods and droughts. Sahel and the surrounding countries in the region have also been inflicted with poverty and violent conflicts in the recent decades.

African countries are highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture. Therefore, the variability of temperature and precipitation has a serious impact on their livelihoods.

While a group of researchers claimed that there were linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, another group pointed out that comparing conflict data with statistics on contemporaneous climate conditions does not reveal that climate variability is an important driver of conflict. Therefore, the question is how do climate change and other factors structure the mechanisms that cause conflicts in Africa.

The case study looks at Burkina Faso, where the variability of temperature and rainfall has had serious effects on food production. It is a multi-ethnic society that faces three types of conflicts:
1) The most frequent type of conflict is the inter-communal conflict between the crop farmers and the agro-pastoralists. Due to the population growth after independence in 1960, soil degradation and long and hot dry season caused scarcity of grazing land. However, for the agro-pastoralists, increased livestock population led to overgrazing. As a consequence, conflicts between crop farmers and agro-pastoralists over land and water have increased.
2) The migration issue of Burkina Faso has frequently increased the tension between migrants and residents. These conflicts imply lack of appropriate policy strategies to overcome environmental impacts and lack of legal solutions to mediate disputes between people.
3) Finally, there is the scarcity conflict which reflects the failure of disaster management by governments leading to violence by nomadic pastoralists.

In case of the three Sahel countries; Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, analyzing the mutual relationship between governance, tension between farmers and pastoralists, Tuareg rebellion and expansion of Islamist armed groups will be important to understand the cause of conflict. Additionally, environmental deterioration, climate-related events and how international aid affects these relationships are other factors that need to be analyzed.

PANEL 2: Q&A

Replying to the question of role of private corporations being sufficient in water supplies, Professor Hussain stated that a middle path should be taken where policies combine the strengths of both state and private entities.

When asked about the river pollution in the Persian Bay leading to large death of farm fishery, Professor Wada stated that this situation can be associated with water conflicts, which can be classified as trigger and weapon type. These water conflicts end up polluting the water bodies.

When asked about the reason for the massive outbreak of locusts, Professor Hanai informed that it was part and outcome of environmental changes, particularly due to the heavy rain in semi-arid areas.

Regarding the question of whether Latin America was more capable of dealing with the local issues of water conflicts, Professor Wada stated that in Latin America, the water issues were closely related to the issues of natural resource management and the relationship with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism brought in privatization of water supply system and this led to conflicts.

Professor Takenaka, a member of the KAKENHI project, in charge of South Asia, invited Mr. Nagano and Ms. Chotani, the South Asian team members of the research project, to present case studies on South Asia.

In the context of the water politics, Mr. Nagano commented that climate change and water politics pose a danger to the India-Pakistan international affairs and can cause serious conflicts in the not-too-distant future.

Professor Nishikida, also a member of the KAKENHI project, in charge of Middle East, informed that the division of role between government and private is important. It is important to flag out that private actors are not contributing to the positive aspect of water distribution but are actually taking advantage of water scarcity.

CLOSING REMARKS: Kiichi Fujiwara, Director, Institute for Future Initiatives, UTokyo
In closing, Director Fujiwara summed up that while the first panel focused on the macroscopic approach towards risk governance, the second panel focused on water and how it relates to conflicts. Ironically, SDGs focus on the role of civil society and credible governance but also demand socially responsible and positive contributions from private corporations.

The right step would be to study climate change as one structural factor that may accelerate and alleviate a potential source of conflict. Additionally, the issue of social distribution of goods would be framed in ways that are different from structural conditions. The process would be multifaceted, and the interpretation would be quite diverse. Whether these elements can be combined into an overall theory of conflict is an open-ended question.

Panel1-1: Risk Assessment of Climate Change and Counteraction(Speech)

Panel1-2: Risk Assessment of Climate Change and Counteraction(Q&A)

Panel2-1: Climate Change and Conflicts(Speech)

Panel2-2: Climate Change and Conflicts(Q&A)