SSU Forum/GraSPP Research Seminar “US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications and Lessons Learned”

The Security Study Unit (SSU) of the Institute for Future Initiatives, in collaboration with The Graduate School of Public Policy (GraSPP) of the University of Tokyo, were delighted and honoured to host a webinar on the topic of the ongoing US withdrawal from Afghanistan with Stephen Biddle, who is currently Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The session was chaired by Chiyuki Aoi, professor of security studies at GraSPP, while Yee Kuang Heng, also a professor of security studies at GraSPP, acted as discussant.
Professor Aoi introduced Professor Biddle not only as a very distinguished scholar and writer, but also as someone who has served in numerous panels and research group with the US government, and has therefore a very rich and multifaced view on the matter of US security policy, particularly on the case of Afghanistan.

Professor Biddle thanked the hosts and immediately provided his impressions on what is currently happening in Afghanistan, stating that, in his view, the US withdrawal is a mistake. The likely outcome is not the continuation of the war against the Taliban by the Afghan government forces alone, but instead the rapid disintegration of the Afghan government and the descent of the country into a state of chaos and civil war. Indeed, the Afghan government is likely to be replaced by the same warlords who have been, in some sense, the guarantors of its existence since the 2001 invasion. This means that, most probably, the conflict in Afghanistan will continue, inflicting unnecessary pain on at least one more generation of Afghans.

A better US policy would have been to stay in the country with a limited military presence, while negotiating a settlement. Such a settlement would have required perhaps another decade or so of commitment, but it was not impossible. The move of the Biden administration follows Trump’s failure in handling negotiations, when the US promised the halve their military presence in exchange for promises which the Taliban did not keep, namely, to detach themselves from Al-Qaeda and to refrain from violent actions.

What are the reasons behind the US withdrawal? Simply put, the post-2001 project of a democratic Afghan state is failing. Afghanistan has a weak central government, but the real power remains in the hands of local warlords and the clientelistic networks they control, as well as their armed branches. These power structures are fueled by corruption and cronyism. Kabul’s government is only able to exist as long as it can keep a double of power: one between different rival warlords in terms of military strength, and the balance of resources that each group controls.

Enlarging the scope of the narrative, Professor Biddle stated that the whole Afghan conflict revolves around the region’s geopolitics and especially about the security of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan fears encirclement by India if Afghanistan had become a successful democratic state, or in any case that India may fill a geopolitical vacuum to the Northwest of Pakistan. As a consequence, already in order to extend its influence over Afghanistan, Pakistan has created and supported the Taliban over the past three decades, even at the cost of losing credibility as a partner in the eyes of the US.

The US interest in Afghanistan is limited and has always had its centre on the impact on the security of Pakistan, and the possible regional/global spillovers of a collapse of Pakistan. As a result of this limited interest, Washington has thought that it was possible to wage a low-intensity conflict with few resources, largely relying on the Afghan Army and Police, which however cannot function well because of already noted corruption and the underlying power structures.

Now that the US has abandoned the original project, the trajectory is rather clear. The Taliban are advancing, and many Afghan soldiers are defecting or fleeing. Will they take over the country entirely? Professor Biddle remarked that this is unlikely. Even before the 2001, the Taliban did not control the whole of the country. Furthermore, the Taliban is not a solid organisation, but a galaxy of groups and networks, and has its internal rivalries and conflicts. Afghanistan is consequently heading towards a new conflictual phase quite similar to the one already experienced in the 1990s after the Soviet withdrawal. But all this may have dear consequences on the stability of Pakistan. So, in the end, the scenario which everybody feared may become reality.

In the discussion that followed, professor Heng asked Professor Biddle to comment about the US administration idea that, even without a physical presence in Afghanistan, the US military can always intervene by deploying its “over the horizon” capabilities. Professor Biddle remarked that that possibility certainly exists, but in reality, any military operation that involves delivering a payload on a target relies on accurate intelligence, and accurate intelligence is inseparable from a presence on the ground.
Furthermore, the Biden administration, as most of the US establishment and the electorate, does not see Afghanistan as an important issue, particularly in electoral terms: the preference of the US public is to get out of Afghanistan, but the salience of the matter is microscopic. The Biden administration sees the Afghan question through the prism of terrorist threats to the US, even if, as mentioned, the real risks pertain to the stability of Pakistan and the region’s geopolitics.