Results

This study examines the military reforms implemented under Xi Jinping’s leadership and their impact on the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). By applying key insights from principal-agent theory to the Chinese context, this study seeks to shed new light on the motivations, processes, and outcomes of these reforms. It argues that two institutional problems in China’s party-military relations had persisted and motivated successive reform efforts: excessive delegation of authority and insufficient oversight. Xi’s recent reforms have primarily addressed the issue of excessive delegation, driving massive organizational restructuring intended to enhance military effectiveness. However, progress has been limited in strengthening the Party’s oversight of the military. This study posits that these uneven reform outcomes stem from Xi’s desire to exert more personalized control over the military. The growing personalization of party-military relations is likely to have signicant implications for the PLA’s combat readiness and Chinese elite politics.