SSU Forum/Tobunken Seminar “The Great Power Next Door: The Past and Present of Chinese Military Intervention in the Korean Peninsula”

On 22 January 2026, a seminar titled “The Great Power Next Door: China’s Past and Present Military Interventions in the Korean Peninsula” was held at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo, with Associate Professor Ji-Young Lee from American University serving as the guest lecturer.
The seminar was co-hosted by the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia and the Security Studies Unit of the Institute for Future Initiatives at the University of Tokyo, and was organized as a part of JSPS Project “The Historical Process of Development of the East Asian International Order: The Connection of Non-Western International Relations Theory and Area Studies”.

Prof. Lee began her presentation by addressing the conventional wisdom of viewing the Korean peninsula as an example of the “curse of geography,” which claims that the Korean Peninsula has suffered approximately 900 invasions throughout history due to its geography. She pointed out that, when carefully looking at empirical historical records and using the clear social science definition of “great power military intervention,” such a popular belief is misleading. She posed the question of why China as a great power has historically avoided military intervention and why it chose to intervene at specific moments.

Prof. Lee presented a perspective that views geography not merely as a physical condition but as a “social construction” formed by discourse and historical memory. Focusing on examining the meaning that Chinese policymakers has held toward the Korean Peninsula, her talk showed how their geopolitical vision of Korea has influenced military intervention decisions across history. She showed that China has preferred stability of a status quo when it was the sole great power exerting influence over the Korean Peninsula, typically opting for non-interference through the symbolic domination of tributary relations. However, she argued that China has resorted to military intervention during moments when the domination of Korea by a rival great power appeared imminent, such as Japan or the United States, thereby heightening the risk of the Korean Peninsula becoming a forward base for hostile forces. Prof. Lee concluded that this logic behind historical pattern resonates with the present day, shedding light on China’s current policy toward North Korea, its stance toward the U.S.–ROK alliance, and the attitude toward Korea unification. She noted that in this era of intensifying US-China strategic competition, Beijing’s Korea policy has aimed at preventing the Korean Peninsula from becoming a force multiplier for the United States.

Discussant Dr. Naosuke Mukoyama (Associate Professor at the Institute for Future Initiatives, the University of Tokyo), while highly appraising the bridging of long-term historical analysis with contemporary international relations and the introduction of critical geography, raised three points: (1) whether the Sui–Tang case, in which Goguryeo itself was a threat as an internal great power, differs from the structure of countering external rival great powers seen in other cases; (2) how to explain “negative cases” where China did not intervene against threats such as the Wako (Japanese pirates); and (3) how to interpret the paradox of continuity in which pre-modern China as a hegemon and modern China, having undergone the “Century of Humiliation,” share similar threat perceptions.

The second discussant, Dr. Antoine Roth (Project Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Law, Tohoku University), raised the following points: (1) whether the frequency and nature of interventions would change depending on the definition of “China”—specifically, whether to include non-Han dynasties such as the Liao, Jin, Yuan, and early Qing, or Inner Asian polities; (2) regarding the definition of “intervention,” whether there is a diverse spectrum that includes coercion and punitive expeditions beyond military dispatch; and (3) whether those metaphors referring to Korea was not present from the beginning but was constructed ex post facto through geopolitical crises such as the early Ming conflict with the Mongols and Hideyoshi’s invasions.

During the Q&A session, the floor and online participants actively engaged in the discussion. Specific questions raised included the implications of contemporary perceptions regarding Goguryeo’s historical attribution seen in China’s “Northeast Project,” how Korean agency interacted with China’s geopolitical vision, the nuances between differing metaphors that China used to refer to Korea historically, and the reasons for not emphasizing the “tributary system” as a primary analytical framework in this study.
In response to the questions, Prof. Lee structured her response around three main dimensions. First, regarding the definition of “China,” she explained that she prioritized contemporaries’ historical consciousness and the concept of translatio imperii or “zhengtong,” as well as whether contemporaries and later generations recognized the entity as part of the Chinese empire. Second, while acknowledging that the Sui–Tang campaigns against Goguryeo were a unique case, she mentioned that the memory of their failure and the signification of the Liaodong region played a decisive role in shaping China’s subsequent view of the Korean Peninsula, including its aversion to the risks and costs of direct rule. Third, regarding the implications for a contingency in the Korean Peninsula today, she cautioned against the notion we can predict the future from the past instances and yet expressed the view that Chinese intervention behavior is likely to depend on the geopolitical vision of the Korean Peninsula—that is, a consideration of how U.S. movements and presence might change.

In his closing remarks, the moderator, Professor Ryo Sahashi, highlighted the significance of this research in fusing historical perspectives with social scientific analysis, while also touching upon Prof. Lee’s previous book, China’s Hegemony. The seminar concluded with a round of applause.